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EXPLANATION IN MATHEMATICAL CONVERSATIONS:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
ALISON PEASE†, ANDREW ABERDEIN∗, AND URSULA MARTIN‡
Abstract. Analysis of online mathematics forums can help reveal how expla-
nation is used by mathematicians; we contend that this use of explanation may
help to provide an informal conceptualisation of simplicity. We extracted six
conjectures from recent philosophical work on the occurrence and characteristics
of explanation in mathematics. We then tested these conjectures against a
corpus derived from online mathematical discussions. To this end we employed
two techniques, one based on indicator terms, the other on a random sample
of comments lacking such indicators. Our findings suggest that explanation is
widespread in mathematical practice and that it occurs not only in proofs but
also in other mathematical contexts. Our work also provides further evidence
for the utility of empirical methods in addressing philosophical problems.
1. Introduction
In Hilbert’s 24th problem he stresses the importance of simplicity in mathematics,
proposing to give criteria for the simplicity of proofs in formal systems of mathematics.
With his ideas on the subject largely under-developed, it is difficult to say why
Hilbert placed so much value on simplicity, rather than, say, proposing to formalise
the notion of a good proof, as others have done since (Gowers, 2000; Tao, 2007).
The notion of simplicity in mathematics is of philosophical, as well as mathe-
matical interest. Many writers associate simplicity with beauty: as Ru¨diger Thiele
observes, ‘It is widely believed among mathematicians that simplicity is a reliable
guideline for judging the beauty . . . or elegance . . . of proofs’ (Thiele, 2003, 5,
citations omitted). This is also a commonly held viewpoint among philosophers of
mathematics (see Inglis and Aberdein, 2015, 89, for multiple examples). However,
a recent empirical study into how mathematicians actually use adjectives such as
simple, beautiful, ingenious, or fruitful, found no relationship between ‘beautiful’
and ‘simple’ (Inglis and Aberdein, 2015). Instead, ‘simple’ was seen as the opposite
of dense, difficult, intricate, unpleasant, confusing, tedious, elaborate, non-trivial,
and obscure.
For that matter, Hilbert himself does not explicitly link simplicity to beauty, and
elsewhere, he relates simplicity to a lightening of cognitive load. He contrasts a
simple problem statement with one which is convoluted, commenting of the latter:
‘confronted with them we would be helpless, or we would need some exertion of
our memory, to bear all the assumptions and conditions in mind’ (Thiele, 2003, 4).
Thiele writes ‘Hilbert himself possessed an uncanny ability to make things simple,
to eliminate the unnecessary so that the necessary could be recognized’ (Thiele, 2003,
4, our italics), suggesting an increasing signal-to-noise ratio, to borrow a concept
from engineering. The notion that a good proof involves simplicity is corroborated
by Tim Gowers: in his identification of six features associated with good proofs, he
talks about clarity (i), ease of understanding (ii, iii), reducing difficult problems to
simple ones (v), and explanatoriness (vi) (but omits any talk of beauty) (Gowers,
2000, 81 f.).
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This suggests that our search for simplicity should move from aesthetic to epis-
temic criteria. But, what sort of epistemic criteria? There are several possible
candidates. We could, for example, focus on mathematical understanding or mathe-
matical clarity. However, if anything, these concepts are even more under-theorised
than simplicity. By contrast, the nature of explanation in mathematics has long been
a focus of philosophical enquiry. In this paper we draw on accounts of explanation in
mathematics and investigate them empirically. We hope that studying an aspect of
mathematics that is so closely related to simplicity will help to lay the groundwork
for a deeper understanding of Hilbert’s 24th problem.
Although several competing theories of explanation have been proposed, they all
have well-known limitations. A given account of explanation may work well for its
devisor’s chosen examples, but struggle to account for examples chosen by rivals.
We maintain that this demonstrates the limitations of traditional philosophical
methodology in solving such problems. Luckily, there are two recent developments
which may be applied to the resolution of this old problem. Firstly, a variety of
empirical methods have been applied to philosophical questions under the umbrella
term experimental philosophy or ‘x-phi’. In philosophy of mathematics, the emerging
programme of using empirical data to investigate mathematical practice has come to
be known as ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematics’ (Buldt et al., 2008; Lo¨we et al.,
2010; Pantsar, 2015). This programme has employed a diversity of data sources but
not, we believe, the source on which we rely. This is a product of the second major
recent development, the emergence of online collaborative mathematics projects
(Barany, 2010; Cranshaw and Kittur, 2011; Pease and Martin, 2012; Stefaneas and
Vandoulakis, 2012; Kloumann et al., 2016). These generate significant quantities of
information on the process of mathematics, much of it publicly available, providing
an invaluable but as yet comparatively neglected source of data for philosophical
enquiry. In this paper we show how an analysis of one such project can help reveal
how explanation is used by mathematicians.
In §2 we propose six conjectures derived from some existing and novel theories of
explanation applicable to mathematical practice. In §3 we introduce our specific case
study, the online collaborative mathematics in Gowers and Tao’s Mini-Polymath
projects, 2009–2012. §4 introduces the methods we used to investigate our case
study, §5 presents the data that we derived by these methods, and §6 assesses their
implications for our conjectures. Finally, §7 states our conclusions and outlines some
prospects for further work.
2. Six Conjectures about Mathematical Explanation
In this section we will introduce the conjectures which our empirical study tests.
Mathematics poses two distinct problems for theories of explanation (Mancosu,
2008, 134). Firstly, the existence of mathematical explanations in the natural
sciences is difficult to reconcile with some theories of scientific explanation: not all
such theories leave room for a physical observation to be explained by appeal to a
mathematical fact. Secondly, explanation within mathematical practice is a hard
case for many theories of explanation: the facts of mathematics do not appear to
be related by either laws of nature or causation. Our concern is exclusively with
the second problem, intramathematical explanation, although some of the theories
devised to address it may also seek to address the first problem, extramathematical
explanation.
One response to the difficulty of characterizing mathematical explanation would
be to deny that there is any such thing. Michael Resnik and David Kushner claim
that in actual mathematical practice, as opposed to philosophical reflection on
that practice, explanation is ‘barely acknowledged’ (Resnik and Kushner, 1987,
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151); a similar view is expressed by Jeremy Avigad (2006, 106). But the most
protracted critique of the existence of mathematical explanation is due to Mark
Zelcer (2013). He reiterates these earlier claims that there is no tradition of
explanation in mathematical practice and argues that, in the absence of such
a tradition, mathematical explanation can only be understood by analogy with
explanation in other sciences. He advances several reasons for rejecting such an
approach to mathematical explanation, each of which turns on an aspect of scientific
explanation (such as a relationship with predictions or a role in reducing surprise)
that involves something mathematics allegedly lacks (predictions and surprise,
respectively). However, as Zelcer acknowledges, the burden of proof is only on
his side if he can sustain the empirical claim he shares with earlier authors: that
there is no ‘implicit strand running through the history of mathematics that is
most naturally interpreted as a search for what philosophers have been calling
explanations’ (Zelcer, 2013, 180). If support for such a strand can be found in
mathematical practice, then the disanalogies Zelcer uncovers between scientific and
mathematical explanation can no longer be read as evidence for the nonexistence of
the latter.1 This leads to our first conjecture:
Conjecture 1. There is such a thing as explanation in mathematics.
Bas van Fraassen developed one of the first theories of explanation that was not
obviously inapplicable to mathematics, although it was not specifically developed
with mathematics in mind. Van Fraassen argues that previous accounts of scientific
explanation have ‘mislocate[d] explanation among semantic rather than pragmatic
relations’ (Van Fraassen, 1977, 150); that is, explanation is intrinsically contextual.
His ‘pragmatic’ account proceeds from the claim that all explanations are answers to
why-questions (Van Fraassen, 1977, 149). Van Fraassen exploited the development
of erotetic logic, the formal analysis of questions, to build a more nuanced theory
which stresses the importance of context. Hence his explanations are contrastive:
in order to answer ‘Why A?’, we need to know the contrast class—is it ‘Why A
rather than B?’ or ‘Why A rather than C?’? Specifically, van Fraassen analyses
natural language why-questions in terms of abstract why-questions, Q = 〈Pk, X,R〉,
where Pk is the topic, the proposition requiring explanation; X is the contrast class,
a range of other propositions Pi; and R is a relevance relation that an answer A
must bear to 〈Pk, X〉 in order to comprise a reason why Pk (Van Fraassen, 1980,
143).2 Abstract why-questions are intended to remedy the characteristic ambiguity
of natural language why-questions—in practice, for each such question there will
be many, distinct candidates for Q, the choice to be determined by the broader
context. Van Fraassen augments this descriptive account with a probabilistic system
of evaluation, which we will set aside as obviously inapplicable to mathematical
practice (Sandborg, 1998, 613). However, David Sandborg has argued that why-
question accounts in general are poorly suited for mathematics. For, he asks, if
you don’t understand a proof, how do you know which why-question to ask? For
many proofs, knowing which why-question would elicit an explanatory answer is a
large part of knowing that answer (Sandborg, 1998, 621). Sandborg concludes that
although ‘a theory of why-questions may aid the theory of explanation, the theory
of explanation must go beyond it’ (Sandborg, 1998, 623). Our second conjecture
addresses the van Fraassen/Sandborg debate:
Conjecture 2. All explanations are answers to why-questions.
1For a more extensive critique of Zelcer, see (Weber and Frans, 2017).
2Kitcher and Salmon demonstrate that van Fraassen’s relevance relation is vulnerable to
trivialization: without some sort of restriction on what may count as a relevance relation, any true
proposition may count as an explanation of any other (Kitcher and Salmon, 1987, 319).
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Mark Steiner was one of the first philosophers of mathematics to devise a the-
ory of explanation for mathematics. For Steiner, proofs are explanatory if they
turn on a ‘characterizing property’ of some entity, which he defines as ‘a property
unique to a given entity or structure within a family or domain of such entities or
structures’ (Steiner, 1978, 143). Hence characteristic properties deploy contrastive
explanation, a device he shares with van Fraassen, to rehabilitate an Aristotelian
appeal to essence. Several authors complain that Steiner’s account of explanation is
vulnerable to the charge that characterizing properties are often very difficult to find
(Resnik and Kushner, 1987, 149; Hafner and Mancosu, 2005, 240; Cellucci, 2008,
206). Steiner himself acknowledges a similar challenge from Solomon Feferman, but
shows how Feferman’s example of an explanatory proof apparently lacking a charac-
terizing property may be transformed in such a way as to make the characterizing
property explicit (Steiner, 1978, 151). However, as Resnik and Kushner observe, if
a mathematician as experienced as Feferman can’t spot characterizing properties, it
is hard to see how they can play much of a role in mathematical practice (Resnik
and Kushner, 1987, 147).
Where Steiner’s account is specifically tailored to mathematics, Philip Kitcher’s
is intended to be of wider application, although it shows the influence of Kitcher’s
work in the philosophy of mathematics. Kitcher contends that the key feature of
explanatory proofs is that they unify. He uses this insight to characterize optimal
explanation in terms of the knowledge base, K, of a scientific community and what
he calls the ‘explanatory store’ of that knowledge base, E(K), which he defines as
‘the set of arguments acceptable as the basis for acts of explanation by those whose
beliefs are exactly the members of K’ (Kitcher, 1981, 512). The optimal explanatory
store is then taken to be ‘the set of arguments that achieves the best tradeoff
between minimizing the number of premises used and maximizing the number of
conclusions obtained’ (Kitcher, 1989, 431). Kitcher argues that this can be achieved
by minimizing the number of ‘argument patterns’, distinctive forms of argument.
Kitcher concludes by foreshadowing more recent empirical work, arguing for the
need ‘to look closely at the argument patterns favored by scientists and attempt to
understand what characteristics they share’ (Kitcher, 1981, 530).
The problem with Kitcher’s account is that it is easy to gerrymander because of its
dependence on a ‘basic intuition, namely that unifying and explanatory power can be
accounted for on the basis of quantitative comparisons alone’ (Hafner and Mancosu,
2008, 170). Johannes Hafner and Paolo Mancosu illustrate the problem with three
proofs of the same theorem, drawn from a graduate textbook: they show that
just totting up the numbers of schematic argument patterns actually misidentifies
as most explanatory the proof the textbook authors found least explanatory. In
general, what are sometimes called ‘nuclear flyswatter’ proofs,3 in which a single,
disproportionately powerful technique is repeatedly applied, will be rated highly by
Kitcher, whereas elegant combinations of several distinct but simple techniques will
not. To remedy this, Kitcher needs an account of qualitative differences of proof
method, which he does not have.
A presupposition of both Steiner’s and Kitcher’s accounts of mathematical
explanation is that they appeal to a higher level of generality: that is, both involve
an abstraction away from the specific proof under consideration to some content that
a key feature of the proof shares with such features in other proofs (and, perhaps,
elsewhere). For Steiner, the higher level content is a ‘characteristic property’ that
distinguishes a specific entity from other, related, entities; for Kitcher, the higher
3Hilbert employs a similar metaphor concerning proof, ‘Given 15-inch guns, we don’t shoot
with the crossbow’ (quoted in Thiele, 2003, 13), but to a different end: for Hilbert the calibre of
the gun corresponds to the strictness of the proof method, not its scope.
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level content is a unifying feature, typically a shared argument pattern. On either
account, it should be expected that a proffered explanation will appeal to a higher
level, which leads to our next conjecture:
Conjecture 3. Explanation occurs primarily as an appeal to a higher level of
generality.
One moral which may follow from this brief survey of the difficulties facing
philosophical theories of mathematical explanation is the importance in any empirical
study of having regard to the context of explanations. In particular, van Fraassen’s
relevance relation must be subject to some sort of contextual constraint, if it is to
resist trivialization (Kitcher and Salmon, 1987, 319). Some progress in this direction
may proceed from an unexpected source:
(1) Trace explanations: ‘reveal the so-called execution trace, the sequence of
inferences that led to the conclusion of the reasoning’;
(2) Strategic explanations : ‘place an action in context by revealing the problem-
solving strategy of the system used to perform a task’;
(3) Deep explanations : ‘the system answers the question by using the knowledge
base of the user, and not just that of the system [. . . ] the explainer must
base the explanation on its understanding of what the explainee fails to
understand’ (Walton, 2004, 73).
This distinction, presumed to be mutually exclusive, originates in the development
of software for medical expert systems (whence it was retrieved by Douglas Walton,
and applied to mathematics by Michel Dufour, 2014, 6). Researchers found it
useful to distinguish three types of knowledge required for ‘understanding physicians’
explanations of their reasoning, as well as being a foundation for re-representing
the knowledge’ (Clancey, 1983, 221). These three kinds, structural, strategic, and
support knowledge, are distinct from the domain knowledge, such as facts about
medicine. Structural knowledge indexes the domain knowledge into rules; strategic
knowledge imposes a plan of how to apply these rules, in pursuit of which goals, and
in which order; and support knowledge comprises the broader background which
provides the justification for structural and strategic knowledge. Hence a request for
explanation could be construed as a request for one of these three sorts of knowledge,
which the system may meet by outputting a trace, strategic, or deep explanation,
respectively (Moulin et al., 2002, 174). That is, each of the three comprises a
different contextual constraint on the relevance relation. By limiting that relation
to independently motivated instances, Kitcher and Salmon’s trivialization may
be headed off. Indeed, van Fraassen’s own discussion of relevance already draws
distinctions that echo the trace/strategic/deep distinction. For example, ‘asking for
a sort of reason that at least includes events-leading-up-to’ is naturally construed as
a request for a trace explanation, whereas asking for a ‘motive’ would seem to be a
request for a strategic (or perhaps deep) explanation (Van Fraassen, 1980, 143).
Perhaps surprisingly, explaining mathematical reasoning and explaining the out-
put of an expert system are very similar activities. In both cases the item requiring
explanation is obtained as the end state of protracted ratiocination. This is quite
unlike the characteristic situation in natural science, where the item requiring expla-
nation is a naturally occurring phenomenon, not the product of a reasoning process.
Following a reasoning process (trace explanation) or even learning why specific
steps were chosen over others (strategic explanation) does not provide the same
understanding of why the result is correct that ensues when it is connected to what
is already understood (deep explanation). So trace, strategic, and deep explanations
do seem to arise in mathematical practice: for example, to request explanation of
a particular mathematical result could be to seek clarification of specific steps in
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the proof that led to the result (trace); it could be to seek the rationale behind the
choice of steps (strategic); it could be a more comprehensive attempt to ground
the result in a secure knowledge base (deep). If this initial impression is born out
by empirical observation, then the threefold trace/strategic/deep distinction would
represent a well-motivated basis for constraining van Fraassen’s relevance relation,
and thereby rehabilitating his account of explanation, at least for mathematics.
Thus we make a further conjecture:
Conjecture 4. Explanations can be categorised as either trace explanations, strate-
gic explanations, or deep explanations.
A second, broader aspect of context salient to our enquiry is that we should be
prepared for the context of mathematical explanation to exhibit both distinctive
and generic features. That is, there may be contextual features of mathematical
explanations that are similar to those of many other sorts of explanation, and
there may be contextual features of mathematical explanations that are unique to
mathematics. These two contextual questions led to our last two conjectures.
A concern for the generic aspects of context shared with non-mathematical expla-
nation comports with the observation that ‘daily discourse is filled with explanations
of behavior in terms of the agent’s purposes or intentions’ (Malcolm, 1968, 46). As
in Norman Malcolm’s examples, ‘He is running to catch the bus’ or ‘He is climbing
the ladder in order to inspect the roof’, the purposive elements can arise in the
explanans; but purposive elements can arise in the explanandum too. For example,
‘She took her umbrella because she thought it would rain and she didn’t want to
get wet; she thought it would rain because she had heard the weather forecast and
she didn’t want to get wet because she was on her way to a party’. Here purposive
elements arise in the explanans of the first clause, which is itself the explanandum
of the second clause. Without endorsing any particular theory in the philosophy
of mind, we may observe that the explanatory role of purposive elements is also
foundational to Michael Bratman’s belief/desire/intention (BDI) model of practical
reasoning, which has itself been widely influential in the development of software
agents (Bratman, 1987). Thus beliefs, goals, desires, and like purposive elements
may play a role in mathematical explanation too. That is,
Conjecture 5. Explanations in mathematics contain purposive elements.
The last conjecture, addressing the specifically mathematical aspects of context,
recognizes Steiner’s acknowledgement that his is an account not of ‘mathematical
explanation, but explanation by proof ; there are other kinds of mathematical
explanation’ (Steiner, 1978, 147). We therefore conjecture that proof will be only
one mathematical context among many in which explanation may occur:
Conjecture 6. Explanations can occur in many mathematical contexts.
The last two conjectures are necessarily more exploratory than the others, if
only in the sense that we did not prejudge the scope of their answers in advance of
any analysis of our data. Rather, as described below in §4.4, we developed sets of
purposive elements and mathematical contexts on the basis of a pilot analysis of a
subset of the data.
3. Online Collaborative Mathematics
To apply empirical methods to the study of mathematical explanation we looked
for a suitable source of data which, ideally, would capture the live production of
mathematics rather than the finished outcome in textbook or journal paper; would
exhibit explanation in practice through capturing mathematical collaboration; and
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could be argued to comprise the activities of a representive subset of the mathe-
matical community. The dataset we chose was the Mini-Polymath projects, online
collaborations on a blog to solve problems drawn from International Mathematical
Olympiads.
One of the popular myths about mathematics that does not survive investigation
of mathematical practice is that it is a solitary pursuit. Although there are celebrated
incidents of ‘solo ascents’, such as Andrew Wiles’s lengthy pursuit of the Taniyama–
Shimura conjecture, successful mathematical practice is more characteristically
collaborative: for example, single authored papers make up only 36% of the articles
published in the leading research journal Annals of Mathematics between 2000 and
2010 (Sarvate et al., 2011, 11). In recent years, the increasing ubiquity and reliability
of online networking tools has facilitated the growth of remote collaboration between
larger and more widely dispersed groups than has hitherto been practicable. In 2008
Tim Gowers and Terry Tao, both winners of the Fields medal, the mathematicians’
Nobel Prize, set up the Polymath projects (Gowers, 2009a), in which mathematicians
collaborate in public on a blog to solve leading-edge problems. An important aspect
was that the activity was owned by the mathematical community, avoiding the
supposed ‘bureaucracy’ of other sites (Butler et al., 2008), hence rules of engagement
were collaboratively designed to foster openness, civility and inclusivity, for example
encouraging participants to post remarks representing a ‘quantum of progress’ rather
than doing lengthy pieces of work in isolation (Gowers, 2009a). Some authors have
argued that Polymath is potentially revolutionary, ‘the leading edge of the greatest
change in the creative process since the invention of writing’ (Nielsen, 2008): if
the outcome to date is less dramatic, with around half the projects so far initiated
leading to significant progress, most noticeably (Polymath, 2012), it is nonetheless
widely discussed and regarded by a number of leading mathematicians as significant,
with ongoing reflection on how to refine the process (Polymath, 2014).
Such sites provide a new and substantial corpus of data on mathematical practice.
Online forums and blogs for informal mathematical discussion reveal some of the
‘back’ of mathematics: ‘mathematics as it appears among working mathematicians,
in informal settings, told to one another in an office behind closed doors’ (Hersh,
1991, 128).4 As Gowers has observed, Polymath is ‘the first fully documented
account of how a serious research problem was solved, complete with false starts,
dead ends etc. It may be that the open nature of the collaboration was in the end
more important than its size’ (Gowers, 2009b).5
It remains an open question how representative online behaviour is of other
mathematical practices. Indeed, one should be careful not to assume that there
is a “standard” mathematical behaviour: recent empirical studies by Matthew
Inglis and colleagues into whether there is agreement between mathematicians
on proof validity and appraisal call into question what he calls an ‘assumption
of homogeneity’.6 Diversity in mathematical practice is recognised by the series
of recent conferences on mathematical cultures and practices (Larvor, 2016), by
the ethnomathematics community, by philosophical analyses of such notions as
mathematical style (Mancosu, 2009), and so on.
4Our use of the distinction between the ‘front’ and ‘back’ of mathematics, which Hersh derives
from Erving Goffman, should not be read as an endorsement of all the implications which Hersh
derives from it, some of which have been criticized by Greiffenhagen and Sharrock (2011a,b).
5For more discussion of online mathematics, including analysis of these corpora to learn more
about mathematical practice, see Barany (2010); Cranshaw and Kittur (2011); Pease and Martin
(2012); Stefaneas and Vandoulakis (2012).
6They found ‘widespread disagreement between our participants about the aesthetics, intricacy,
precision and utility of the proof,’ (Inglis and Aberdein, 2016, 163), and that ‘there is not a single
standard of validity among contemporary mathematicians’ (Inglis et al., 2013, 270).
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The International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO) is an annual competition, in
which around 500 high school students a year take part in national teams of six, with
each individual tackling the same problem set, problems that have been carefully
chosen (and translated into many languages), with the intention that each team
is treated fairly, and all students gain from taking part. Nearly 17,000 people
have competed since its inception in 1959, with many more involved through the
significant training and development activities run by national organisations, which
have been credited with building capacity and a wider cultural change in attitudes to
mathematics (Saul, 2011). Many of those taking part have gone on to mathematical
careers, some at an outstanding level—fourteen of the 36 Fields medal winners
between 1978 and 2014 were IMO participants. It seems reasonable to assume that
the Olympiad ‘culture’ may be regarded as background for a significant fraction of
the world’s professional pure mathematicians. For example, Tao remarked of the
Olympiad ‘the habits of problem solving—taking special cases, forming a subproblem
or subgoal, proving something more general, and so on—these became useful skills
later on’, while observing that ‘serious mathematical research involves other skills:
acquiring an overview of a body of knowledge, getting a feeling for what sorts of
techniques will work for a certain problem, putting in long and sustained effort to
accomplish something’ (quoted in Saul, 2011, 415).
In 2009 Tao started a series of four annual experiments, designated Mini-Polymath,
which extended the Polymath format to tackle the hardest question in four successive
IMOs, each solved by just a few participants in the actual competition. It should
be stressed that, whereas the participants in the IMO are high school students,
participation in Mini-Polymath was open to all, but mostly drawn from readers of
Tao’s blog. Many participants were anonymous, but identifiable participants include
graduate students, postdocs, and faculty members in mathematics or related fields.
The ground rules for the Mini-Polymath projects were again carefully designed
(Minipolymath1, 2009): people who knew the answer or had already attempted
the problem were asked not to take part; participants were asked not to search the
internet or consult the mathematical literature; participants were encouraged to
share ideas as soon as possible even if they were ‘frivolous’ or ‘failed’, as others might
find them helpful or be able to repair them; and, unlike the actual IMO, participants
were asked not to compete to be the quickest, but to view themselves as contributing
to a team effort ‘to experimentally test the hypothesis that a mathematical problem
can be solved by a massive collaboration’.
The first such experiment, Mini-Polymath 1, the ‘Grasshopper problem’, was
solved by just 3 of the the 565 participants in the 2009 IMO. The online experiment
attracted 70 participants, who over a period of 35 hours made 258 posts to solve
the problem (followed by 100 or so posts reflecting on the process), with just two
posters accounting for 18% of the posts (Sarvate et al., 2011). The four Mini-
Polymath projects contain a total of around 750 posts. Alison Pease and Ursula
Martin analysed the contributions to Mini-Polymath 3, the ‘Windmill Problem’,
and strikingly found that a mere 14% of the posts represented proof steps, with
the bulk referring to examples or counterexamples (33%), conjectures (20%) or
concepts (10%) and the rest comprising miscellaneous comments for clarification or
encouragement (Pease and Martin, 2012).
4. Method and Procedure
In this section we present the method we employed to test the conjectures we
proposed in Section 2, with the results following in Section 5. Our study was
intended to be sufficiently light in its methodological presuppositions as not to
prejudge any account of explanation. We presumed only that explanation involves
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some sort of interaction between a comment and its social and mathematical context.
We employed two related methods to test each of our conjectures:
(1) Close content analysis (see Krippendorff, 2004) of a complete search over
four mathematical conversations, based on the presence of explanation
indicators; and
(2) Close content analysis of randomly selected excerpts from the same four
mathematical conversations, based on the absence of explanation indicators.
Close content analysis is a qualitative methodology, common in social sciences,
in which presence and meanings of concepts in rich textual data and relationships
between them are systematically transformed into a series of results. The method
proceeds by analysis design, application and narration of results. Analyses may be
text-driven, content-driven or method-driven, depending on whether the primary
motivation of the analyst is the availability of rich data, known research questions or
known analytical procedures. Krippendorff (Krippendorff, 1980) dates the method
back to the early twentieth century and gives several examples of different disciplines
using it to analyse their data, and social impact of results found in this way.
These include content analyses being used in legal and political settings, including
acceptance as evidence in court, monitoring other countries for adherence to nuclear
policies, and analysing internal factors such as quality of life.
Validity is partially established via replicability, which involves both intra-
annotator and inter-annotator agreement; known respectively as stability (the
degree to which the method of analysis data yields the same results, given the
same data, at different times) and reproducability (the extent of agreement between
results achieved by different people applying the same method to the same data).
4.1. Source material. Our source material is drawn from the online mathematical
conversations described in §3. Specifically, we used all of the Mini-Polymath
conversations to date: (Minipolymath1, 2009; Minipolymath2, 2010; Minipolymath3,
2011; Minipolymath4, 2012). Each project comprised a research thread, in which
the problem was explored and a proof was collaboratively constructed; a discussion
thread, in which meta-level issues were raised; and a wiki page in which progress was
summarised. We analysed the comments on the research thread, 742 in total (see
Table 1 for details of the key times and numbers of comments and participants, and
Figure 1 for the timeline of the number of accumulated comments).
4.2. Methods. We formulated our six conjectures, or research questions, based on
a review of the literature on explanation, as shown above. We then used problem-
driven content analysis to explore our conjectures, motivated by the epistemic
phenenomena relating to explanation. In order to ascertain stable correlations,
all three co-authors independently read a portion of the content and conducted
(separately) analysis identifying factors related to explanation.
Each of us has a first degree in Mathematics; one of us has a PhD in Mathematics
and over 10 years experience as a professional research mathematician; the other
two have PhDs in other disciplines but each has more than 10 years experience
studying mathematical reasoning. Our analyses were compared and we initially
found inter-annotator disagreements between our intuitions as to whether a comment
primarily played an explanatory or justificatory role in the conversation. We also
found disagreement at the intra-annotator level, suggesting that “intuition” for this
schema was weak and unreliable. These disagreements resulted in a minor redesign
of classificatory schemata: once we had settled on the schemata presented in this
paper we found that the disagreements disappeared and classification was reliable at
both inter- and intra-annotator levels. The first author then performed a complete
analysis in accordance with discussion between all three. For each instance of a
10 PEASE, ABERDEIN, AND MARTIN
Table 1. The data we used in our empirical investigation of ex-
planation in mathematical practice
Year IMO Timeline Comments/Words Participants
(before solution)
2009 Q6 Start: July 20, 2009 @ 6:02 am 356/32,430 81–100
Solution: July 21, 2009@ 11:16 am (201)
End: August 15, 2010 @ 3:30 pm
2010 Q5 Start: July 8, 2010 @ 3:56 pm 128/7,099 28
Solution: July 8, 2010 @ 6:24 pm (75)
End: July 12, 2012 @ 6:31 pm
2011 Q2 Start: July 19, 2011 @ 8:01 pm 151/9,166 43–56
Solution: July 19, 2011 @ 9:14 pm (70)
End: October 17, 2012 @ 3:25 pm
2012 Q3 Start: July 12, 2012 @ 10:01 pm 108/10,097 43–48
Solution: July 13, 2012 @ 7:53 pm (79)
End: August 22, 2012 @ 3:27 pm
TOTAL: 742/58,792 185–221
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Figure 1. Timeline of the number of accumulated comments for
each MiniPolymath conversation.
keyword, the surrounding context was carefully taken into consideration, in order
to ensure that the close content analysis reflected the correct usage.
We used two approaches to investigate which explanations occur in informal
mathematical conversations and in which contexts they arise. These procedures are
represented schematically in Figure 2.
The Explanation-Indicator Approach (EIA). We used indicators which are as-
sociated with explanation in order to identify possible instances of expla-
nation (see §4.3). We conducted an automated complete search for these
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indicators over the comments section of the four blogs on which the Mini-
Polymath conversations were hosted (Stage 1, see §4.3). For each occurrence
of an indicator we performed close content analysis of the entire comment
and comments around it, using cues from these to try to determine whether
explanation played a role (Stage 2). We then performed close content analy-
sis for each occurrence of a keyword which we categorised as an explanation
(Stage 3). We made a number of contextual considerations. We looked at
the sentence and comment in which the keyword occurred, identified the
explanandum and the explanans (which may occur in different comments or
may not both be present), considered the wider context of the explanation
by looking at the other comments surrounding it and answered several ques-
tions about the nature of the explanation. For each keyword we considered
whether there is a corresponding why-question (possibly implicit) (C2) and
whether there was a clear difference of level (general or specific) between
the explanandum and explanans which thus might be seen in terms of a
characteristic property or unifying feature (C3). We also asked whether
the keyword occurred in the context of object-level proof (i.e. concerned
reasoning steps leading to a conclusion), or that of meta-level comment
or meta-level proof (i.e. concerned a strategy employed), or in some other
context (C4), what the context of the proof was, what sort of thing was
being explained, and what sort of explanation was offered (C5, C6). We
give an example analysis to demonstrate our EIA method in Fig. 3 below.
The Random Comment Approach (RCA). This approach was designed to pick
out explanations which might not contain any of our explanation indicators.
We analysed a random 10% of our corpora of 742 comments (§4.1), which
were found using a random number generator. The analysis followed similar
stages to the Explanation-Indicator Approach: Select a comment at random
and discard it if it contains an explanation indicator (Stage 1); use close
content analysis to determine whether it involves an explanation (or multiple
explanations) (Stage 2); and, if so, use close content analysis to analyse it
according to our dimensions of explanation (Stage 3).
Why do we have two approaches? Firstly, to address the concern that the EIA
may yield an unrepresentative sample. Secondly, so that our study may act as a
pilot for the analysis of much larger datasets. Analysis of all 742 comments would
have been onerous, but within the bounds of possibility; the same could not be
said of datasets larger by an order of magnitude or more. Our two approaches are
loosely inspired by the two methods employed by James Overton to investigate
the occurrence of explanation in articles published in the journal Science (Overton,
2013, 1384). However his focus on published work, almost none of it mathematics,
led us to make substantial revisions.
4.3. Choice of explanation indicators. The usefulness of indicator terms in
recognizing arguments has long been known to the authors of textbooks: ‘The use
of premise and conclusion indicators (words like “since”, “because”, “therefore”,
“hence”, “it follows that” and so on) to help students identify the components of
an argument is a standard part of most critical thinking textbooks and courses’
(Butchart et al., 2009, 273). For example, (Copi et al., 2007, 12) provides long lists
of conclusion-indicators and premise-indicators. Even longer lists may be found
elsewhere (for example, Gratton, 2002). There is little sign of any theoretical work
underpinning the compilation of these lists. Nonetheless, it is usually at least
acknowledged that these indicators can be ambiguous. In particular, authors often
12 PEASE, ABERDEIN, AND MARTIN
Input: 742 comments in 4
online maths conversations
from 2009–2012
Does it
contain a
keyword?
Go to next
comment
Is it an
explana-
tion?
Go to next
keyword
(i) Identify explanandum and
explanans (ii) Analyse both
explanandum and explanans in
terms of conjectures 2–7, in
the light of the context
surrounding the explanation
After all keywords and all
comments have been analysed,
output results
for each comment:
Yes: for each instance
of a keyword:
Yes
Repeat for each keyword
and each comment
No
No
Input: 74 random comments
in 4 online maths
conversations from 2009–2012
Does it
contain a
keyword?
Go to next
comment
Is it an
explana-
tion?
Go to next
comment
(i) Identify explanandum and
explanans (ii) Analyse both
explanandum and explanans in
terms of conjectures 2–7, in
the light of the context
surrounding the explanation
After all keywords and all
comments have been analysed,
output results
for each comment:
No
Yes
Repeat for each comment
Yes
No
Figure 2. The Explanation-Indicator Approach (left) and the
Random Comment Approach (right).
observe that ‘because’ can function as both premise indicator and explanation
indicator (see, for example, Gratton, 2002, TS 7).7
In recent years more attention has been paid to these indicators as a consequence
of the emergence of ‘argument mining’, the use of automated search techniques
to extract argumentational content from larger texts. The following lists were
developed in this context:
Indicators of premise after, as, because, for, since, when, assuming, . . .
Indicators of conclusion therefore, in conclusion, consequently, . . .
Indicators of contrast but, except, not, never, no, . . . (Wyner et al., 2012, 46)
Despite the lengthy lists of indicators compiled by some authors, in most corpora
a small sample are disproportionately employed and the more obscure indicators
seldom (if ever) occur. A brief exploratory analysis confirmed that this was also
true of our corpus. Hence our first stage comprised of searching for the following
indicators:
• premise indicators: “since”; “because”; “, as”;
• conclusion indicators: “thus”; “therefore”; “, so”;
• explanation indicators: “expla*”; “underst*”.
7The phrase ‘explanation indicator’ has much less currency than ‘premise indicator’ or ‘conclu-
sion indicator’. An apparent exception is (Scriven, 1959, 481), however Scriven uses the term to
refer to concepts, such as ‘fitness’ or ‘tendency’, rather than discourse markers.
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Our search was performed over the comments section of the blogs (not including
words in the problem itself). Both upper and lower case were included, and because
of our search terms, stemming was automatically performed. Our annotated data
can be found in (Pease, Aberdein).
4.4. Close content analysis. A pilot analysis of a subset of our data allowed us to
clarify how we would test C5 and C6. We developed two sets of categories, purposive
and mathematical respectively, which we applied to the comments identified by each
of the two processes, EIA and RCA.
With respect to C5, working from the abstracted examples below, we formulated
associated keywords and constructed four categories of purposive element: abilities,
knowledge, understanding, and values or goals:
Abilities (what can/can’t we do). [Keywords: difficulty, hard, do] Examples:
We can only almost do X; We can do X; We must be able to do X; X is
always possible; X might not be the hardest bit; We can fix X in this way;
The difficult bit might be X.
Knowledge (what do/don’t we know). [Keywords: know, plausible, mistake,
wrong, assume, obvious, suppose] Examples: We don’t know X; X is plausible;
X is wrong; X is a mistake.
Understanding (what do/don’t we understand). [Keywords: understand] Ex-
amples: Why is this a contradiction?
Values/goals (what do/don’t we want). [Keywords: want, goal, need, help, prob-
lem, target, useful] Examples: X is a good idea; We want to do X; X will
achieve our goal; We need to know X; X will help us in this way.
Once we had these categories, we then re-analysed the data and labelled both
explanandum and explanans with whichever purposive categories applied (each
example was labelled with between 0 and 4 categories).
With respect to C6, we performed a similar analysis of the mathematical contexts
of explanations occurring in our corpus of comments. We found that they clustered
into seven types: initial problem,8 proof, assertion, specific instance, argument,
representation, and property:
Initial problem. Examples: The initial problem is harder if X; The initial
problem is hardest when X; Condition X is necessary for the initial problem.
Proof (approach). Examples: X is not a useful approach; Approaches X and
Y might be the same; Approach X might not work; If we can do X then we
have a complete proof.
Assertions. Examples: There is only one of type X; x is not in set X; Y is a
subset of X; If we do X then we’ll get Y; There must always exist X that
satisfies condition Y.
Specific cases/instances. Examples: Things get harder in case X; There will
always exist instance X that satisfies condition Y; The problem works in
instance X; other cases X and Y are trivial; Case X might be a problem.
Arguments. Examples: Let us suppose X. Then Y.
Representation. Examples: there are many ways to write X; by reducing the
problem to X.
Property. Examples: X has this property; X might not be unique; X doesn’t
have this property; X might have this property.
8Note that with the keyword “problem” we distinguished between a mathematical problem –
in the sense of question or conjecture – and an obstacle – something which stands in the way of
achieving a goal. We categorised these respectively as maths-centred and purposive.
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Again, once we had these categories, we re-analysed the data and labelled both
explanandum and explanans with whichever mathematical context categories applied
(each example was labelled with between 0 and 7 categories).
Once we found these seven categories and the four above, we categorised each
instance of explanandum and explanans with whichever applied. If more than
one applied then we used multiple labels. We also considered the number of
co-occurrences between different types of explanandum and explanans in the EIA.
Fig. 3 gives an example of how the close content analysis process was applied,
using the EIA. We list the questions we asked of each indicator-occurrence for our six
conjectures, with their possible answers, with our categorisations for this example
shown in bold.
This seems to be right, but there something I don’t
understand. Please see if you can help me with it:
Start with a square and a point inside it (M):
start with a tangent to the square (your solution
demands a more equal division of points, I know).
When we get to the opposite vertex of the square
all points moved from one side of the line to the
other, but not all points have been visited (M will
never be visited). The argument is almost exactly
the same, so it seems that the equal division of
points plays a crucial role, but I don’t understand
what role exactly. Can we pin it down precisely?
Comment by Gal — July 19, 2011 @ 9:42 pm
If I understand well your example : the problem
is that you must give an orientation to the line.
Then, left and right are define with respect to this
orientation : if the line has made half a turn, then
left and right are reversed. In your example, I think
most of the point move from, say, the part et the
top of the line to the part at the bottom of the
line, but always stay at the right of the line.
Comment by Garf — July 19, 2011 @ 9:47 pm
Got it! Kind of like a turn number in topology.
Thanks! :)
Comment by Gal — July 19, 2011 @ 9:50 pm
C1: Is it an explanation? (One of) yes, no.
What is the explanandum? If the
line has an orientation then with
a half turn every point will now
be on the other side of the line.
What is the explanans? It is impor-
tant that the points are equally
divided.
C2: Is there an implicit (or explicit) why-
question? (One of) yes, no.
C3: Is there a distinction of level between
the explanandum and the explanans?
(One of) yes, no.
C4: What is the wider context of the ex-
planation? (One of) trace, strategic,
deep.
C5: What are the purposive elements for
(i) the explanandum and (ii) the ex-
planans? (i) (As many as apply of)
abilities, understanding, knowledge,
values; (ii) (as many as apply of) abili-
ties, understanding, knowledge, val-
ues.
C6: What is the mathematical context of
(i) the explanandum and (ii) the ex-
planans? (i) (As many as apply of) ini-
tial problem, proof, assertion, exam-
ple, argument, representation, prop-
erty; (ii) (as many as apply of) initial
problem, proof, assertion, example,
argument, representation, property.
Figure 3. Analysis of the first (underlined) instance of underst* in
the quoted passage, listing the questions we asked of each indicator-
occurrence by our six conjectures, and possible answers (with our
answers for this example shown in bold).
5. Findings
5.1. Explanation-indicator approach (EIA). We found 243 instances of our
indicator terms, of which we categorised 176 as connected to explanation. This
gave an average of 0.3 indicators per comment, or 0.2 instances of explanation
per comment. In general we found the explanation and premise indicators to be
more reliable at indicating explanation than our conclusion indicators. The terms
expla*, because, and underst* were especially reliable explanation indicators (with an
aggregate reliability of 88%) and therefore was especially poor (only 45% reliable).
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We show the total number of explanation indicators and the proportion of those
that we rated as genuine explanation across the four conversations in Table 2 and
for each explanation indicator keyword in order of reliability in Table 3.
Table 2. The number of explanation indicators in all four con-
versations, and the proportion of those that we rated as genuine
explanation
Year
Number of
comments
Number of
indicators
found
Indicators
per
comment
Number of
indicators
identified as
explanation
% of
indicators
identified as
explanation
2009 355 105 0.3 74 70%
2010 128 21 0.2 17 81%
2011 151 52 0.3 41 79%
2012 108 65 0.6 44 68%
TOTAL: 742 243 0.3 176 72%
Table 3. The type of explanation indicators across the four con-
versations, and the proportion of those that we rated as genuine
explanation
Indicator
type
Keyword
Number
found
Number
identified as
explanation
%
explanation expla* 2 2 100%
premise because 25 23 92%
explanation underst* 22 18 82%
premise since 62 45 73%
premise , as 7 5 71%
conclusion , so 88 62 70%
conclusion thus 26 16 62%
conclusion therefore 11 5 45%
TOTAL: 243 176 72%
5.2. Random Comment Approach (RCA). A pseudorandom number generator
was used to select 74 comments—approximately one in ten—from the 742 comments
in the corpus. Of these 74 comments, 13 were found to contain explanation indicators,
and therefore discarded. Of the 61 remaining comments, we categorised 13 as relating
to explanation. Thus 21% (13/61) of the randomly selected indicator-free comments
concerned explanation. We show the breakdown for each year in Table 4.
Clearly results found via the EIA were far stronger in terms of evidential support.
The low numbers involved in the RCA prevent us from forming conclusions based on
these; rather results found by following this approach may suggest areas for further
investigation.
5.3. Close content analysis. The results of the close content analysis (§4.4) for
C2, C3, and C4 are summarised in Table 5. Results for C5 and C6 are shown in
Tables 6–8, with the number of co-occurrences between mathematical and purposive
types of explanandum and explanans in the EIA shown in Figure 4.
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Table 4. Comments considered under the Random Comment
Approach, by year
Year
Number
considered
Number
without
indicator
Number
without
indicator
identified as
explanation
%
non-indicator
comments
classified as
explanation
2009 22 20 4 20%
2010 18 16 2 13%
2011 16 13 5 38%
2012 18 12 2 17%
TOTAL: 74 61 13 21%
Table 5. Raw figures and percentages for our labellings for C2,
C3, and C4 (given a total of 176 instances of explanation in the
EIA and 13 instances of explanation in the RCA).
raw %
Conjecture Labelling EIA RCA EIA RCA
C2 Answers to why questions 174 13 99% 100%
Not answers to why questions 2 0 1% 0%
C3 Primarily an appeal to a higher level 4 3 2% 23%
Not primarily an appeal to a higher level 172 10 98% 77%
C4 Trace explanation 121 8 69% 62%
Strategic explanation 42 4 24% 31%
Deep explanation 11 1 6% 8%
Neither trace, strategic, nor deep 2 0 1% 0%
Table 6. The breakdown of our purposive and mathematical con-
text categories for each year, and the proportion of both of these.
Year # Labellings Purposive Maths Explanandum Explanans
2009 180 27% 73% 51% 49%
2010 47 26% 74% 49% 51%
2011 136 18% 82% 52% 48%
2012 122 20% 80% 52% 48%
TOTAL: 485 23% 77% 51% 49%
Table 7. Breakdown of our purposive category using the EIA
Explanandum Explanans Total
value 37% 30% 34%
understanding 30% 34% 32%
ability 19% 21% 20%
knowledge 14% 15% 15%
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Table 8. Breakdown of our mathematics category
Explanandum Explanans Total
EIA RCA EIA RCA EIA RCA
assertion 27% 27% 26% 0% 27% 14%
property 15% 13% 23% 8% 19% 11%
proof 23% 33% 12% 0% 18% 18%
example 16% 7% 18% 46% 17% 25%
representation 9% 13% 7% 38% 8% 25%
argument 2% 0% 10% 8% 6% 4%
initial problem 8% 7% 4% 0% 6% 4%
Pa Pk Pu Pv Mip Mproof Mass Meg Marg Mrep Mprop Total:
Pa 8% (32)
Pk 7% (27)
Pu 7% (26)
Pv 3% (13)
Mip 8% (30)
Mproof 17% (63)
Mass 15% (57)
Meg 14% (55)
Marg 1% (4)
Mrep 9% (33)
Mprop 11% (41)
Total: 5% (19)
6% 
(24)
6% 
(24)
4% 
(15)
5% 
(18)
10% 
(39)
18% 
(70)
15% 
(57)
7% 
(27)
7% 
(26)
16% 
(62) 100 (381)
Ranges for all years 15-1910-145-90-4
Figure 4. Categorisation of all explanandum/explanans pairs
found via our EIA, with explananda shown in the rows and ex-
planantia in the columns. Pa, Pk, Pu and Pv are from our purposive
category (respectively—ability, knowledge, understanding, value);
and Mip, Mproof, Mass, Meg, Marg, Mrep and Mprop are from
our mathematics category (respectively—initial problem, proof, as-
sertion, example, argument, representation and property). Darker
shading indicates more occurrences.
6. Discussion
6.1. Conjecture 1: There is such a thing as explanation in mathematics.
True. On average, 33% of comments contained one indicator, of which we classified
72% as relating to explanation. This gives 23% of the whole conversation as relating
to explanation. Of the remaining 67% of the conversation which did not contain an
indicator, we classified 21% of a random sample as relating to explanation. This
gives a further 14% of the whole conversation, for a combined total of 37% (23 +
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14), thus providing strong empirical support for the conjecture that explanation
does occur in mathematics.
We found that often a sentence seemed to play dual roles in explaining and
justifying, while in a few cases it seemed clearly more one than the other. For
instance, the keyword “since” occurred in the following two comments (our boldface)—
the first of which seems to be straightforward justification within a proof argument,
and the second of which involved explanation.
Maybe some notation would help: if A is your set of possible steps,
then say S(A) is the set of all possible positions you can end up on the
way. So eg, if A = 2, 3, 5, S(A) = 0, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10. Then the above
is saying that for some ai ∈ A where ai /∈ M , there is an mj ∈ M
where mj /∈ S(A− {ai})—in which case you can reduce the problem
to A′ = A− {ai}, and m′ ∈M ′ iff m′ + ai ∈M − {mj}, and since
S(A′) /∈M ′ we have an instance of the n− 1 case.
Part of comment 59, by aj.
Some obvious points:
1) Slot one will never have more than one coin.
2) Slot two will never have more coins that slot three can have
(since it can get the most coins through a swap with three).
Comment by Mike — July 8, 2010 @ 5:05 pm
Such support raises a corresponding challenge for the accounts of philosophers who
claim that explanation plays little role in mathematical practice. The disagreement
here might be thought to be due to different interpretations of explanation and
different types of mathematical practice, in addition to different methodologies for
arriving at conclusions. The mathematical practice which we consider is drawn
from the ‘back’ of mathematics (Hersh, 1991). This contrasts with the ‘front’
mathematical practice of public, polished proofs to which Resnik and Kushner,
Avigad, and Zelcer apparently (if implicitly) restrict their attention. Nonetheless,
since none of these philosophers invoke the front/back distinction themselves, this
is at best a speculative suggestion as to how their view might be defended in the
light of our data. Indeed, at least facially, their work suggests that they intend
their argument to apply to both front and back. For example, whereas stating that
explanation is ‘not an acknowledged goal of mathematical research’ (Resnik and
Kushner, 1987, 151) might be thought to emphasise the front, commenting that
‘the term [explanation] is not so very often used in ordinary mathematical discourse’
(Avigad, 2006, 106) might as readily refer to the back. It could also be objected
that their definition of mathematical explanation was much narrower than ours,
perhaps applying only to what we have called deep explanation: Zelcer, at least,
might be read this way (Zelcer, 2013, 175). But, although deep explanation was the
rarest of the varieties of explanation in our data, there were still enough examples
to lend support to C1 even on this narrow construal.
Moreover, the all but exclusive focus by philosophers on proof in mathematical
practice (sometimes acknowledged, as in Steiner, 1978, 147) contrasts significantly
with our findings, in which our corpus of mathematical practice includes many more
activities. We give a fine-grained breakdown of the type of mathematical activity
which we observed in the context of explanation in §6.6: here proof only forms 18%.
Zelcer grounds his dismissal of mathematical explanation, at least in part, on there
being ‘no systematic analysis of standard and well-discussed texts illustrating any
pattern of mathematical explanations’ (Zelcer, 2013, 180). This may well have been
correct—if only because there had been no systematic analysis of explanation in
any mathematical texts! But our study reveals that some analyses of this sort do
indeed exhibit a pattern of mathematical explanations.
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6.2. Conjecture 2: All explanations are answers to why-questions. True.
99% of explanations in the EIA approach could be read as answers to why-questions,
and 100% in our random comment approach. In all but a handful of cases these
were implicit why-questions, that is, a why-question could be envisaged, which the
explanation would answer. For instance, in the following example, the parenthetical
explanation flagged up by our “because” indicator, can be rephrased as an answer
to the why-question: “Why can we assume that it would be safe for the grasshopper
to hop backwards to its previous point?”:
[. . . ] If the grasshopper at any point finds itself unable to hop forward,
it simply hops backwards to its previous point (which, because we are
working iteratively is assumed to be safe). Of course it might find itself
backtracking the whole path, but since we’re not actually trying to
construct an efficient algorithm this is fine. [. . . ]
Comment by Sarah — 20 July, 2009 @ 2:05 pm
Van Fraassen’s claim that all explanations are answers to (implicit) why-questions
must, presumably, have included the parenthesis—as it is otherwise clearly false
(or else he thought that there were very few explanations). If this allowance is
considered legitimate, then our findings provide extremely strong support for this
aspect of van Fraassen’s pragmatic account. Allowing the why-question to be implicit
rather than explicit may also help to answer one of Sandborg’s criticisms, that if
the particular why-question is already known, then the need for an explanation
is much reduced (someone who does not understand a proof is unlikely to know
which why-question to ask). The issue here concerns van Fraassen’s contrastive
element, as in “Why P rather than Q?” In the above example the contrast class
in the why-question is ambiguous: it could concern the assumption (“why assume
X rather than Y?”), the safety (“why will it be safe rather than dangerous?”), the
direction (“why hop backwards rather than forwards?”), or the particular point
(“why hop to the previous point rather then another one before that?”). The explicit
answer given to the implicit question—“(which, because we are working iteratively
is assumed to be safe)”—may resolve some of the ambiguity, although readings in
which either iteratively or safe is emphasised would both make sense, thus some
ambiguity remains. Thus, the contrast class may also be inherent in the question,
as claimed by van Fraassen, but be unarticulated: a questioner may ask “Why P?”,
with the answerer having to infer which contrast class Q the questioner requires. In
the example above, Sarah is explaining to an imaginary person: the explainer both
constructs and answers the why-question. This shows a way in which to reconcile
Sandborg’s objection with van Fraassen’s contrastive element. We consider that van
Fraassen’s account of explanation as why-questions has been strongly corroborated,
while agreeing with Sandborg’s argument that a theory of explanation must go
beyond a theory of why-questions: indeed we consider our work regarding the
remainder of the conjectures as a step in that direction.
6.3. Conjecture 3: Explanation occurs primarily as an appeal to a higher
level of generality. False. Only 2% of the explanations found in our explanation-
indicator approach had a clear difference of level of generality between the explanan-
dum and explanans, and so could not be said to appeal to a higher level of generality.
While we did find more examples in our random-comment approach—here 23% of
our explanations occurred as an appeal to a higher level of generality—in general
we found that occurrences in which explanandum and explanans had a difference of
level were extremely rare. (This is the area of greatest divergence between our two
approaches: in some ways it is surprising that our findings under both approaches
converge as much as they do.) Certainly, we have shown that for neither data
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set is it true that explanation occurs primarily as an appeal to a higher level of
generality. Those rare examples that did arise were typically in comments containing
(or referring to) proofs. In particular, we found examples of case-split proofs (in
which a case was proved because it was shown to be a special case of the general
(proved) case) and inductive proofs (for instance, “why does a property hold in the
case n = 5?” (explanandum) “Because of the inductive argument that it holds for
all natural n” (explanans)).
For both Kitcher and Steiner, a difference in level of generality between explanan-
dum and explanans would be a prerequisite for their theory. Since Kitcher is so
narrowly focused on proof products, we would not expect to find examples of his
type of explanation in our dataset, and we did not. However, the fact that it was so
rare to find examples does have implications for Steiner’s theory of characterising
properties. While the idea that explanations turn on what is distinctive about an
object may be intuitively appealing, it was not representative of what we found.
There is a sizeable body of work on whether proofs by case split or by induction
are explanatory (for example, Lange, 2009; Hoeltje et al., 2013; Baldwin, 2016),
however since they formed such a small proportion of our examples we conclude
that the lack of evidence that we found for Steiner’s theory suggests that it does
not apply to this context of mathematical practice.
6.4. Conjecture 4: Explanations can be categorised as either trace ex-
planations, strategic explanations, or deep explanations. True. Of the 176
explanations in our explanation-indicator approach, we found that 69% occurred in
the context of trace explanations, 24% as strategic explanations, and 6% as deep
explanations, with 1% classified as none of the three. This result was similar in
our random-comment approach: of 13 explanations, 62% were trace explanations,
31% were strategic explanations, and 8% were deep (the additional 1% comes from
rounding errors). Thus almost all of our examples were covered by the three types
of explanation.
An example of a trace explanation, describing object-level reasoning, is:
“The remaining question is: can 20102010
2010
be written as 4∗(x−2k)?
Clearly, by solving for k, we get k = x/2− (201020102010)/8, which are
integers, so the answer is affirmative.”
This is actually not needed, since we can simple swap B5 ↔ B6
enough times to adjust the content of B4.
Comment by SM — July 8, 2010 @ 7:16 pm
An example of a strategic explanation, explaining problem-solving strategy, is:
Come to think of it, it should be clear that 112 can’t be quite right,
because it always chooses aj as the final step. But we have examples
where that isn’t right (aj was arbitrary so that
∑
i 6=j ai was not in M),
so we know that the correct solution will have to account for the fact
that there may be multiple aj which satisfy that condition, some of
which may not be part of a solving path.
Comment by Henry — July 20, 2009 @ 8:30 pm
An example of a deep explanation, explaining a particular misunderstanding, is:
Hi! I don’t understand Tao’s proof. More specifically, I don’t get the
last sentence “But this forces M to contain n distinct elements, a
contradiction.”
Can anyone elaborate the point a little further for me, please?
Comment by Juan — 24 July, 2009 @ 7:53 am
We looked at proof #1 and have an additional suggestion to pietropc’s
suggestions in his post: in the last paragraph one should chose i as the
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greatest element rather than smallest (or change ai+an−j+1+. . .+an−1
to ai + an−j+2 + . . . + an ) to ensure that all the following numbers
are distinct from each other.
It might be nice to make the three groups of numbers that lie in M
which are n numbers in total more explicit: 1. ai + an−j+1 + . . .+ an
for i /∈ I, 2. ai + an−j+1 + . . .+ an−1 for i ∈ I and 3. for the biggest
i ∈ I the numbers ai + an−j+1 + . . . + an − am.
Comment by Alex and Ecki — 24 July, 2009 @ 7:57 am
Thanks, Alex & Ecki! Now I get it. It’s a beautiful proof!
Comment by Juan — 24 July, 2009 @ 8:16 am
The strategic explanations explained strategic reasoning about proofs at the
object-level (24%), proofs at the meta-level (46%) and meta-level comments (29%).
There may be multiple reasons why there were fewer deep explanations than
other kinds. Firstly, we analysed the data according to a narrow interpretation
of the category. In particular, we considered whether the explainer had taken
into account a particular perceived knowledge base of a particular person, as in
the example above. Over the dialogue as a whole there was a perceived model
of background mathematical common knowledge, as well as a dynamic, socially
constructed collective knowledge base, which was the (implicitly or explicitly) agreed
upon knowledge constructed over the course of the conversation. For instance, some
explanations were given in terms of collected comments which had previously been
agreed—we did not classify these as deep. Additionally there were some explanations
addressed to a subset of the participants—a subset defined by their knowledge base:
e.g. “to those who think the proof works. . . ”. We likewise did not include this either
as deep. For instance, we did not classify the comment below as deep, since there
was nothing in it to indicate a particular insight into the questioner’s knowledge
base (note that this is unusual in that it is the same person asking and giving an
explanation):
A question: Does the windmill process eventually form a cycle?
Comment by Seungly Oh — July 19, 2011 @ 8:48 pm
I guess it should, since there are infinite many iterations and only finite
options.
Comment by Seungly Oh — July 19, 2011 @ 8:50 pm
A second reason for the comparative scarcity of deep explanation may be that,
since the conversation is online, participants usually do not know each other;
additionally many cues such as tone and body language are not represented, and
so it is harder to build up a picture of individual knowledge bases. Thirdly, also
due to the fact that the conversation occurs online in real-time, often with parallel
threads, participants are under time-pressure, and therefore may not articulate lack
of understanding as much as they would in a slower-moving conversation. The
public nature of the conversation may also be a factor here.
There was no pattern as to mathematical context or purposive element in the
deep explanations. An example of a deep explanation concerning a conceptual
misunderstanding is below:
Ohhh... I misunderstood the problem. I saw it as a half-line extending
out from the last point, in which case you would get stuck on the
convex hull. But apparently it means a full line, so that the next point
can be “behind” the previous point. Got it.
Comment by Jerzy — July 19, 2011 @ 8:31 pm
Yeah, so it’s an infinite line extending in both directions and not just a
ray. I’m thinking spirograph rather than convex hull.
Comment by Dan Hagon — July 19, 2011 @ 8:44 pm
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That trace, strategic, and deep explanation appear to be exhaustive of the
mathematical explanations we investigated supports our contention that they could
provide an effective constraint on van Fraassen’s relevance relation. It would seem
that when mathematicians ask each other for explanations, they are almost always
asking for one of these, so little will be lost if these are the only varieties available.
6.5. Conjecture 5: Explanations in mathematics contain purposive ele-
ments. True. The EIA resulted in 485 labellings across conjectures 5 and 6 (an
average of 2.8 labels per explanation (485/176), with 51% of the labels attached
to the explanandum and 49% to the explanans. Of these, 23% of our labels were
purposive-related and 77% were mathematics-related. The RCA resulted in 33
labellings (an average of 2.5 labellings per explanation), of which 15% concerned
purposive and 85% concerned mathematics; with the explanandum/explanans split
as 61%/39%. (Since the RCA produced such a small number of purposive-related
labels, we made no further use of it in assessment of conjecture 5.)
The EIA purposive labels were equally spread over explanandum and explanans,
with value and understanding being the largest categories (34% and 32%, respectively)
and ability and knowledge being smaller, but still significant categories (20% and
15%, respectively). We show the breakdown in Table 7 above.
6.6. Conjecture 6: Explanations can occur in many mathematical con-
texts. True. As discussed in §6.5, the EIA produced 485 labellings of which 77%
were mathematics-related and the RCA produced 33 labellings of which 85% were
mathematics-related. The labels resulting from both approaches clustered into seven
types—assertion, property, proof, example, representation, argument, and initial
problem—shown in Table 8 above.
There was some difference between those mathematics labels applying to the
explanandum and explanans. On the EIA, assertion, example, and representation
applied in similar distributions to the explanandum and to the explanans, while the
other labels had unequal splits across explanandum and explanans. On the RCA,
there is essentially no agreement between explanandum and explanans. Taking the
total of explanandum and explanans labels, on the EIA the labels fell into three
broad groups, with the largest category being assertion, then property, proof and
example and the smallest representation, argument and initial problem. However, on
the RCA, example and representation were most numerous, followed by assertion,
property, and proof, with argument and initial problem being least represented.
We also considered the number of co-occurrences between different types of
explanandum and explanans in the EIA: our findings are shown in Figure 4,
where darker shading indicates more occurrences. This shows that the most com-
mon explanandum–explanans pairs are proof–proof, assertion–assertion, example–
example, and assertion–property. While this may not be surprising, it is not always
the case that the diagonals in Figure 4 have the darkest shading: an explanandum
about an assertion is equally likely to be answered with an explanans about a
property, as an assertion: it is also fairly likely to be answered with an explanans
about an example or an argument. Likewise, an explanandum about a proof may
well be answered with an explanans about an assertion or an example. In terms of
the purposive elements, explananda about what one is able to do are most likely
to receive an answer about what one is able to do, an assertion or a property.
Explananda about what one knows are most likely to be answered with an assertion.
With such low numbers of explanation-labellings in the RCA, it did not make
sense to break down the co-occurrence of explanandum–explanans pairs, but our
most frequent combination was proof–representation (mathematics-related) and
assertion–example (mathematics-related), both occurring 14% of the time.
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7. Conclusions and Future Work
Our empirical investigation of mathematical practice shows that explanations are
an essential component, largely driven by why-questions, embedded throughout the
mathematical process, not just in proofs, and with a clear purposive element. While
it is false that they appeal to a higher level of generality, they can be classified in
terms of whether they explain reasoning at a trace or strategic level, and whether
they take into account another’s knowledge base. We have found a large, rich and
diverse set of explanations in our investigation, taking place in a variety of dialogues.
One of the distinctive contributions of this paper is its methodology. Mathe-
maticians are not constrained by philosophers’ norms, so analyses of their practices
should not preemptively narrow the range of accounts to the philosophically re-
spectable. Our study is yet further evidence for the value of such a data-led approach
in addressing philosophical problems. While we share this attitude with much recent
work in x-phi, we have departed significantly from the survey-based techniques
by which x-phi is best known. A corpus-based approach has been applied to the
philosophical analysis of explanation before, notably in (Overton, 2013). However,
we differ from Overton in our emphasis on the process of mathematics in progress
(the ‘back’) rather than the finished product (the ‘front’). This emphasis led us to
a second innovation: whereas Overton’s corpus consists of published articles, we
studied a corpus derived from a community of mathematicians actively pursuing
a solution to a problem. This also brought out the significance of collaborative
work: contrary to the romantic image of the mathematician as solitary genius, much
mathematical research is conducted interactively. We believe that the tools we have
developed for these purposes (such as the RCA and the EIA) lend themselves to
wider application to mathematical practice, such as a study of informal notions of
simplicity (and perhaps beyond).9 There are other larger-scale projects to which they
could be applied, including the original Polymath project and its successors. Results
found using the methodology presented here could be usefully triangulated with
participant interviews conducted once the conversation is considered to be finished,
and/or with real-time observations in which a researcher observes a participant,
using a think-aloud protocol, during the conversation.
The results of this paper have important lessons for the study of explanation in
mathematics. We advanced six conjectures concerning intramathematical expla-
nation. We found evidence to support five of them and to reject the sixth (C3).
That conjecture, that explanation occurs primarily as an appeal to a higher level of
generality, is presupposed by the two best-known accounts of mathematical expla-
nation, those of Steiner and Kitcher. Hence our study found little direct support
for either of the two most influential positions, an important negative result. Our
positive results are even more interesting. Contrary to some sceptical accounts,
our findings confirmed the conjecture that explanation does indeed play a role in
mathematics (C1). We also found support for the conjecture that all explanations
can be framed as answers to why-questions (C2). Since this is a presupposition
of van Fraassen’s account of explanation, this provides some modest support for
that account. We found that the neglected distinction between trace, strategic, and
deep explanations can be usefully applied to explanation in mathematics, which
9How might such a study of mathematical simplicity proceed? Of our two approaches, the RCA
would be the easier to adapt: the same, or a similar, corpus of mathematical conversation could be
sampled for comments that were judged by an annotator to invoke considerations of simplicity. The
EIA poses more of a challenge, since there is no preexisting tradition of using indicator terms that
could be redeployed as simplicity indicators the way we used argument indicators. One possibility
would be to search for the terms that cluster with “simple” as descriptors of proof in (Inglis and
Aberdein, 2015, 98).
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we suggest may usefully support van Fraassen’s account (C4). We confirmed that
explanations in mathematics contain purposive elements (C5), demonstrating their
intimate connection to the intentions of the mathematicians who employ them. One
of our most important results was that explanations are not confined to proofs:
they can occur in the context of many different types of mathematical context (C6).
This challenges the almost exclusive attention paid to proof in most philosophi-
cal treatments of mathematical explanation and also raises questions concerning
Hilbert’s 24th problem: can we formalise the notion of simplicity of a definition, a
question, an example?
Our results open up numerous avenues for future research, both empirical and
non-empirical. Space constraints prevent us from discussing more than a few of
the most promising here. The support we found for the existence of mathematical
explanation (C1) could be reinforced empirically in two ways: either by studying
other mathematical corpora, transcripts of face-to-face collaborations between math-
ematicians, or digital archives of mathematicians’ correspondence; or by contrasting
mathematical corpora with non-mathematical corpora, whether of scientific practice,
or of everyday language. Between them, our investigations of the conjectures C2,
C3, and C4 suggest that van Fraassen’s account of mathematical explanation may
be better situated than its obvious rivals, the accounts of Steiner and Kitcher.
However, this paper only presents a preliminary investigation: an empirical defence
of van Fraassen would need to explore all the details of his picture. For example,
the role of contrast classes would need to be investigated: is it possible to identify
a contrast class for each implicit why-question? Perhaps the most exciting aspect
of our study is the groundwork it undertakes for future philosophical accounts of
mathematical explanation and related concepts, such as mathematical understand-
ing, mathematical clarity, or mathematical simplicity. It not only challenges current
theories, it also identifies what should be the key features of a more empirically
based successor. We hope to return to all of these issues in future papers.
Hilbert’s 24th problem represents a challenge and an opportunity for researchers
in automated reasoning; some of the implications that a formal notion of simplicity
might have for automated theorem proving are teased out in (Thiele, 2002). Gowers’
work on formalising a good proof (Gowers, 2000) was specifically written with
computer proof in mind. Likewise, we see our work on explanation as being
potentially relevant to automated reasoning. The importance of explanations in AI
and Computing in general is now a research programme in its own right (now gaining
traction under the banner of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)). The new EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduces a “right to explanation”
of algorithmic decisions, making the topic especially pertinent. We anticipate that
informal as well as formal and philosophical as well as computational interpretations
of notions such as simplicity, explanation and understanding will gain new relevance
as progress is made in bridging the gap between human and automated reasoning.
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